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NOTES
ARTICLE 22 OF THE WARSAW CONVENTION AND
FRANKLIN MINT V TWA : A CONFLICT
BETWEEN TREATY AND
MUNICIPAL STATUTE*
INTRODUCTION
The Warsaw Convention' (the Convention) was established in
* The author wrote this Note while a secondyear student at the Cornell Law School.
During the Summer of 1983, he worked at Haight, Gardner, Poor & Havens, New York, a
lawfirm that submitted an amicus curiae brief to the United States Supreme Court. During
that time, he revised the Note, and used sources made available through thefirm. This Note
represents the personal views of the author; his conclusions have not changed since he first
submitted the Note for publication. [Editors]
1. Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, concluded October 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S.
11 [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention]. The Warsaw Convention was the result of
two conferences held in Paris in 1925 and Warsaw in 1929. Although the United States
was not one of the original parties to the Convention, President Roosevelt proclaimed
America's intention to adhere to the Convention in 1934. Proclamation of President
Franklin D. Roosevelt, 49 Stat. 3000 (1934). After Senate approval, the Convention
assumed the status of a treaty, "equal in stature and force to the domestic laws of the
United States." Smith v.Canadian Pacific Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798, 801 (2d Cir. 1971)
(dismissing suit under Warsaw Convention for lack of treaty jurisdiction over Canadian
air carrier). Next to the United Nations Charter, it is the most widely adopted interna-
tional treaty. A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW, 7-98 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter cited as
AVIATION LAW]. There have been four subsequent modifications to the Convention.
The first was accomplished at the Hague, Netherlands and came to be known as the
Hague Protocol of 1955. The United States never ratified the amendment, in large part
because of dissatisfaction with the liability limitations. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsonn,
The United States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARV. L. REV. 497, 512-14 (1967). For
the text of the Hague Protocol of 1955, see CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD, AERONAUTICAL
STATUTES AND RELATED MATERIAL 324-66 (1983). Opposition to the Warsaw Conven-
tion and the Hague Protocol developed into pressure for the United States to withdraw
from the Convention. On November 15, 1965, the United States filed a Notice of Denun-
ciation. Lowenfeld & Mandelsonn, supra at 551. The State Department, however, indi-
cated that it would withdraw the notice, which was to take effect in six months, if there
was indication that an international agreement would be reached addressing the con-
cerns of the United States. Id. at 551-52. A conference was held at Montreal in 1966
and--despite the threat of withdrawal-members failed to reach agreement on a propo-
sal satisfactory to all parties. Prior to the denunciation taking effect, however, an interim
arrangement called the Montreal Agreement was reached among international air carri-
ers. This was the second modification to the Warsaw Convention. The Montreal Agree-
ment is a "special contract" under Article 22(l) of the Warsaw Convention, which
provides that carriers and passengers "may agree to a higher limit of liability." The
agreement increased the personal injury limits from $8,300 to $75,000 per injury. See
Protocol Relating to Certain Amendments to the Convention on International Civil Avi-
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1929 to limit international air carrier liability and to provide a
degree of uniformity to the fledgling aviation industry. The Conven-
tion created a system of rules to govern the carriage of passengers,
baggage, and cargo in international flights and set uniform standards
applicable to documents and the determination of air carrier liabil-
ity. In Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans WorldAirlines, Inc.,2 the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Warsaw Convention's limits
on liability for loss of cargo are unenforceable in United States
courts. The decision is significant because it is the first case in which
a court has declined to enforce the Convention's liability limits.
Franklin Mint not only abolishes limits on liability for loss of
cargo-it implicitly casts serious doubt on the Convention's limits
for personal injury. The court's holding has a tremendous impact
upon the international aviation community because virtually all
international air carriers are subject to the jurisdiction of the Second
Circuit.3
The Convention adopted gold as its unit of conversion for trans-
ation, done June 14, 1954, 8 U.S.T. 179, T.I.A.S. No. 3756, 320 U.N.T.S. 217 [hereinafter
cited as Montreal Agreement]. Although this was a private agreement among the carri-
ers, it effectively modified the Convention with respect to flights departing from or arriv-
ing or stopping in the United States. In exchange for the $75,000 liability limits, carriers
agreed to waive their Article 20(1) defense under the Convention which provides: "[t]he
carrier shall not be liable if he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary
measures to avoid the damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take such
measures." Warsaw Convention, supra. This action, in effect, imposes strict liability on
the carriers. While the Montreal Agreement did not allay all the concerns of the United
States, it was sufficient to placate opponents of the Convention and the Notice of Denun-
ciation was withdrawn two days before it was to become effective. Lowenfeld & Mendel-
soan, supra, at 596. The Montreal Agreement did not alter the cargo liability limits. A
third attempt to amend the Convention was made in Guatemala City in 1971. AvIATION
LAW, at 7-153 to 7-155. The proposal was to raise the liability limits to $100,000 without
reference to airline fault. Protocol to Amend the Warsaw Convention (Guatemala City
Protocol), March 8, 1971, I.C.A.O. Doc. 8932, reprinted in A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION
LAW, DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT, 975-84 (2d ed. 1981). The final and most recent attempt
to amend the Warsaw Convention came at the Montreal Conference of 1975. For a
discussion of the resulting Montreal Protocols, see infra note 40. As of this writing, the
United States has not ratified the Montreal Protocols. Thus, the United States presently
adheres to the original Convention and the Montreal Agreement of 1966. See generaly
Lowenfeld & Mendelsonn, supra; Fitzgerald, The Four Montreal Protocols to Amend the
Warsaw Convention Regime Governing International Carriage by Air, 42 J. AIR L. & COM.
273 (1976); AvIATION LAW, supra; Barlow, Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention: In a
State of Limbo, 8 AIR. L. 2 (1983); Minutes, Second International Conference on Private
Aeronautical Law, Warsaw, October 4-12, 1929 (Homer and Legrez trans. 1975) [herein-
after cited as Aeronautical Law Conference Minutes].
2. 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S.Ct. 3084 (1983).
3. The Second Circuit includes New York City, a major port of entry for interna-
tional air carriers. Under the Warsaw Convention, domestic and foreign international
air carriers are subject to suit in one of four fora. Article 28 provides in part:
(1) An action for damages must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the
domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a
WARSAW CONVENTION
lating judgments into domestic currencies.4 Subsequent events in the
international monetary system,5 however, led Congress to rescind
the official price of gold in the United States by repeal of the Par
Value Modification Act. It was through this official price that
awards under the Convention had been calculated by United States
courts. The conflict between the treaty and this Congressional action
generated confusion and uncertainty as to international air carrier
liability limits. Domestic courts, in their efforts to reconcile the con-
flict, applied different units of conversion in place of gold. In Frank-
lin Mint, the Second Circuit refused to adopt a new conversion
standard, and held that the Convention's liability limits for loss of
cargo are no longer enforceable in the United States.
This Note first describes the history of the current problem.
Second, it discusses the procedural aspects of Franklin Mint. Third,
the Note addresses the failure of the Second Circuit to exercise its
constitutional obligation to give effect to the Warsaw Convention.
Finally, the Note surveys four possible alternatives that could have
been used by the court to reconcile the two statutes. It concludes
that the court should have adopted the International Monetary
Fund's Special Drawing Right as the appropriate unit of conversion.
I
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
The parties to the Warsaw Convention drafted the document in
the late 1920s to ensure uniformity and to protect the infant aviation
industry from ruinous damage suits and high insurance premiums.6
Uniformity was thought essential to the industry because the myriad
of domestic laws throughout the world created uncertainty about a
carrier's potential liability and, ultimately, its operating costs. 7 The
place of business through which the contract has been made, or before the court
at the place of destination.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28. If any of the above fall within the Second
Circuit, the carrier is subject to suit there and the precedent set in Franklin Mint.
4. See infra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 24-30 and accompanying text.
6. See Lowenfeld & Mendelsonn, supra note 1, at 498-99; see also Reed v. Wiser,
555 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977) (plaintiffs could not
recover from air carrier's employees, or from the carrier and its employees together, a
sum greater than that recoverable in suit against carrier itself as limited by the Warsaw
Convention).
7. Reed, 555 F.2d at 1090. It appears that there was fear of discouraging capital
investment in the industry. In a sense, it did not matter what domestic limit was placed
upon carrier liability. The absence of a uniform standard induced forum shopping.
Thus, an investor could not be sure of the maximum potential liability he would incur or
of the costs necessary to comply with the different domestic standards. See Lowenfeld &
Mendelsonn, supra note 1, at 499-500.
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Convention created a rebuttable presumption of carrier liability in
cases of personal injury and damage to or loss of property." Articles
17, 18, and 19 set forth a carrier's liability for personal injury, dam-
age or loss of baggage, and damage caused by delay.9 Articles 20
and 21 established lack of fault and contributory negligence as
affirmative defenses to rebut the presumption of liability.'0 Finally,
Article 22 delineated carriers' liability limits both in cases of per-
sonal injury and loss or damage to goods. I
From its inception, the Convention has used gold as a unit of
conversion12 for calculating the maximum liability of carriers.13 The
drafters agreed to use gold as the standard because, at the time, it
provided stability and uniformity, and permitted conversion of
awards into national currencies apart from the vagaries of currency
fluctuations.14 The uniform system of conversion aided the interna-
tional aviation industry by providing carriers and insurance compa-
8. Lowenfeld & Mendelsonn, supra note 1, at 500.
9. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, arts. 17, 18, 19.
10. Id, arts. 20, 21. The Convention maintained carrier liability on the basis of neg-
ligence, but Article 20 shifted the burden of proof to the carrier and required it to show
that it had taken all necessary measures to avoid injury or damage. See Lowenfeld &
Mendelsonn, supra note I, at 500.
11. Article 22 of the Convention provides:
(I) In the transportation of passengers the liability of the carrier for each pas-
senger shall be limited to the sum of 125,000 francs. Where, in accordance with
the law of the court to which the case is submitted, damages may be awarded in
the form of periodical payments, the equivalent capital value of the said pay-
ments shall not exceed 125,000 francs. Nevertheless, by special contract, the car-
rier and the passenger may agree to a higher limit of liability.
(2) In the transportation of checked baggage and of goods, the liability of the
carrier shall be limited to a sum of 250 francs per kilogram, unless the consignor
has made, at the time when the package was handed over to the carrier, a special
declaration of the value at delivery and had paid a supplementary sum if the case
so requires. In that case the carrier will be liable to pay a sum not exceeding the
declared sum, unless he proves that the sum is greater than the actual value to
the consignor at delivery.
(3) As regards objects of which the passenger takes charge himself the liability
of the carrier shall be limited to 5,000 francs per passenger.
(4) The sums mentioned above shall be deemed to refer to the French franc
consisting of 65 milligrams of gold at the standard of fineness of nine hundred
thousandths. These sums may be converted into any national currency in round
figures.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22.
12. A "unit of conversion" or "unit of account" is the method by which international
conventions specify, and make fungible, liability limits. Although a ceiling is set on lia-
bility in terms of the "unit of conversion," compensation is actually received in national
currencies. The Warsaw Convention's unit of conversion enables courts to convert liabil-
ity limits into domestic currencies and to determine how much a claimant is entitled to
recover. See Ward, The SDR in Transport Liability Conversions: Some Clarcations, 13
J. MAR. L. & COM. 1 (1981).
13. Id. at 2.
14. McGilchrist, Carriage by Air: What is a Poincare Gold Franc Worth? 2 LLOYD'S
MAR. & COM. L. Q. 164 (1982); see also H. DRION, LIMITATIONS OF LIABILITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW 183 (1954); see generally Asser, Golden Limitations of Liability
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nies with an accurate measure of their potential liability.' 5
Moreover, the system removed the undesirable incentive to "forum
shop" for the jurisdiction with the most favorable liability limits.' 6
The Convention achieved uniformity by employing the French gold
franc' 7 (Poincark franc).' 8 It thereby ensured that liability limits
would be tied to the value of gold.
From 1934-the beginning of United States adherence to the
Convention' 9-until 1978, domestic and foreign courts encountered
few problems setting liability limits and converting awards into
domestic currencies. Congress first set the value of gold at thirty-five
dollars per troy ounce.20 In 1945, the United States became a mem-
in International Transport Conventions and the Currency Crisis, 5 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 645
(1973-1974).
15. In conveying the Warsaw Convention to the Senate in 1934, Secretary of State
Cordell Hull remarked:
It is believed that the principle of limitation of liability will not only be beneficial
to passengers and shippers as affording a more definite basis of recovery and as
tending to lessen litigation but that it will prove to be an aid in the development
of international air transportation, as such limitation will afford the carrier a
more definite and equitable basis on which to obtain insurance rates, with the
probable result that there would eventually be a reduction of operating expenses
for the carrier and advantages to transportation charges.
Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, Message from the President of the United States
Transmitting a Convention for the Unffeation of Certain Rules (remarks of Secretary of
State Cordell Hull), Sen. Exec. Doc. No. G, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1934).
16. The Brussels Convention illustrates the problems encountered when a Conven-
tion does not specify liability limits in terms of a stable unit of account. See Interna-
tional Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of
Lading signed at Brussels, August 25, 1924, 51 Stat. 233, T.S. No. 931, 120 L.N.T.S. 155
[hereinafter cited as Brussels Convention]. The Brussels Convention set its liability limits
in monetary units based on their gold value converted by pounds sterling. The signato-
ries were permitted, however, to provide in their municipal legislation an amount in
domestic currency equivalent to the sterling amount at the time of legislation. Subse-
quent changes in the exchange rates between the domestic currencies and the pound
sterling destroyed the equality of liability limits among the signatories. Thus, when an
injured party found that his bill of lading was governed by the laws of more than one
signatory, he had an incentive to litigate in the country having the highest liability limits.
See Asser, supra note 14, at 647-48.
17. The Convention established that liability limits mentioned within the article
"shall be deemed to refer to the FRENCH FRANC consisting of 65 1/2 milligrams of
gold at a standard of fineness of nine hundred thousandths." Warsaw Convention, supra
note 1, art. 22, § 4.
18. The Poincark franc was named for the French Prime Minister under whose
administration the franc was defined as "65.5 milligrams of gold of millesimal fineness
nine hundred." Asser, supra note 14, at 645. It has been employed in "all gold clause
limitations of liability provided for in multilateral conventions concerning transportation
by sea or by air, concluded after 1924." Id. at 645-46. See generally McGilchrist, supra
note 14.
19. See supra note 1. The United States did not participate in the drafting of the
Convention and only sent an observer to the Warsaw Conference. See Lowenfeld &
Mendelsonn, supra note 1, at 502.
20. See United States Gold Reserve Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-87, 48 Stat. 337
(1934).
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ber of the International Monetary Fund (IMF),21 and, under the
Bretton Woods Agreements, promised to maintain the value of U.S.
dollars in gold. 22 The pronouncement reaffirmed the stability of gold
and, thus, its appropriateness as a unit of conversion, because the
dollar was the primary international reserve currency.23
By the early 1960s, a chronic balance-of-payments deficit
emerged in the United States and the attractiveness of the dollar
waned.24 Distrustful of the international monetary situation, specu-
lators exchanged dollars for gold at an ever increasing rate,25 thereby
depleting world gold reserves. 26 In 1968, the central banks of the
United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Belgium, Italy, Switzerland, and the Netherlands agreed to
discontinue the supply of gold to private markets.27 In effect, this
action established a two-tier system of gold pricing: one set by mar-
ket forces, the other set by the official price formula of the Bretton
Woods Agreements.28 Despite these efforts, United States gold
reserves spiralled downward while the balance-of-payments deficit
soared.29 In 1971, the United States informed the IMF that it was
withdrawing its commitment to maintain the value of dollars in
gold.30
21. The International Monetary Fund was established at the Bretton Woods Confer-
ence in 1944 to encourage international monetary cooperation, to promote the growth of
international trade, and to aid the establishment of a multilateral system of payments for
currency transactions among member States. See Bretton Woods Agreement Act, ch.
339, Pub. L. No. 79-171, § 2, 59 Stat. 512, 512 (1945) (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 286 (1982));
see also P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 666-67 (1lth ed. 1980).
22. At the Bretton Woods Conference the participants adopted a system whereby
each country would express the par value of its currency "in terms of gold as a common
denominator or in terms of the United States dollar of the weight and fineness in effect
on July 1, 1944." G. MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 177 (1977).
In the Articles of Agreement of the IMF, each member assumed an obligation to "main-
tain the value of its currency within a margin of one per cent of its par value." Id. The
United States achieved this objective by agreeing to buy and sell gold freely at the par
value; the other members met their commitment by ensuring that transactions in their
currencies were effected within one per cent of their par value in terms of the U.S. dollar.
Thus, the system depended greatly upon the United States freely buying and selling gold
at its par value. See id.; see also Gold, Gold in International Monetary Law: Change,
Uncertainty, andAmbiuity, 15 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 323, 326-27 (1981).
23. See P. SAMUELSON, supra note 21, at 670.
24. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 721 (9th ed. 1973).
25. See Asser, supra note 14, at 650.
26. See P. SAMUELSON, supra note 24, at 721.
27. See Asser, supra note 14, at 650; see also G. MILLER, supra note 22, at 178.
28. G. MILLER, supra note 22, at 178. For a discussion of the resultant two-tier sys-
tem, see Gold, supra note 22, at 340-44.
29. See Asser, supra note 14, at 651.
30. See Gold, supra note 22, at 348. This action led to the demise of the par value
system which had been established pursuant to the IMF Articles. See supra note 22.
Soon afterwards, other industrialized nations followed suit and suspended their obliga-
tion to maintain the par value of their currencies. See Asser, supra note 14, at 651.
WARSAW CONVENTION
The dollar crisis created serious doubts about the suitability of
gold as a stable and uniform monetary standard. This led the IMF
in 1978 to abolish the official price of gold and to substitute the Spe-
cial Drawing Right (SDR)31 as the Fund's reserve asset and unit of
conversion.32 The United States took similar action and abolished
gold's official price through the repeal of the Par Value Modification
Act.33 Gold thus became a commodity subject to a fluctuating mar-
ket price.
Although Congress did not specifically focus upon the Warsaw
Convention in repealing the official price of gold, its action plainly
affected the status of the treaty's unit of conversion.3 4 With the dra-
matic change in the international monetary system, problems with
the Convention's liability limits soon became apparent. Gold could
no longer provide the stability and uniformity required of a unit of
conversion. Floating exchange rates and the fluctuating free market
price of gold presented courts with difficult choices when called upon
to convert the Convention's liability limits into national currencies.
Before the abandonment of the official price of gold, the Con-
vention's signatories met in Montreal to discuss the future role of
gold and its potential impact on the treaty. From that meeting
emerged the Montreal Protocols (Protocols), 35 in which the parties
agreed to substitute the IMF's SDR 36 as the Convention's new unit
3 1. The Special Drawing Right is an international unit of account established by the
IMF in 1969 to facilitate transactions among its members. The value of one SDR is
determined by a basket of five currencies. For a discussion of the SDR, see infra notes
158-83 and accompanying text.
32. Under the Jamaica Accords of 1976, the IMF formulated a plan to introduce the
SDR as the Fund's reserve asset. The plan was approved by the members and became
effective April 1, 1978. See International Monetary Fund, Proposed Second Amendment
to the Articles o/Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. A Report by the Execu-
live Directors to the Board of Governors (1976), reprinted in 15 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS
501 (1976); Franklin Mint, 690 F.2d at 308; see generally, Edwards, The Currency
Exchange Rate Provisions of the ProposedAmendedArticles of the Agreement of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 722 (1976).
33. See Bretton Woods Agreement Act, Pub. L. No. 94-564, § 6, 90 Stat. 2660, 2661
(1976) (effective April 1, 1978). The official price of gold was first set at $35 per troy
ounce by the United States Gold Reserve Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-87, 48 Stat. 337
(1934). In 1972, the official price was adjusted to $38 per troy ounce by the Par Value
Modification Act, Pub. L. No. 92-268, § 2, 86 Stat. 116 (1972). Another adjustment
occurred in 1973 when gold's official price was raised to $42.22 per ounce by the Par
Value Modification Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-110, § 1, 87 Stat. 352 (1973) (for-
merly codified at 31 U.S.C. § 449 (1976)).
34. For a discussion of the official price of gold as a unit of conversion and argu-
ments in favor of its use notwithstanding its repeal, see infra notes 137-57 and accompa-
nying text.
35. See generally Fitzgerald, supra note 1; AVIATION LAW, supra note 1.
36. For a discussion of the use of the SDR within the Warsaw Convention, see infra
notes 158-83 and accompanying text.
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of conversion. 37 That measure was adopted because the SDR
seemed to adhere most closely to the intent of the drafters. The Pro-
tocols were first submitted to the Senate in 1977,38 but to this date
they have not been ratified.39 It is important to note, however, that
rejection of the Protocols has been based upon the issue of liability
limits for personal injury, not upon the SDR issue.40
37. In Montreal, the United States took the lead in proposing the adoption of the
SDR and signed Protocols Nos. 3 and 4. See AVIATION LAW, supra note 1, at 7-171.
Protocol No. 3 raised the liability limits for personal injury or death to approximately
$120,000, regardless of airline fault. Responding to the strong resistance to liability lim-
its that exists in some circles, the Protocol permits each nation to establish a supplemen-
tal compensation plan to augment the basic limit. Pursuant to this provision, in the
United States the Civil Aeronautics Board approved a plan providing an additional
$200,000 of recovery for loss of life. Passengers pay a two dollar per ticket surcharge for
the additional coverage.
Protocol No. 4 amends and updates the cargo provisions of the Convention and adopts
the most recent rules on cargo documentation and liability limits in cargo cases. More-
over, it sets the liability limits at 17 SDRs (approximately $20 per kilogram of cargo. See
Leigh, The Montreal Protocols to the Warsaw Convention on International Carriage by
Air, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 412, 413 (1982). One commentator observed that "the new War-
saw limit, [using the SDR, was] intended to be as faithful a translation as possible of...
Poincarb francs at the 'old' official price of gold." McGilchrist, Four New Protocols to the
Warsaw Convention, L. MAR. & COM. L. Q. 186, 187 (1976).
38. See Message from the President of the United States, Transmitting Two Related
Protocols to the Conventionfor the Unofcation of Certain Rules Relating to International
Carriage by Air, Sen. Exec. Doc. No. B, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
39. The Montreal Protocols last came to the Senate for approval in March 1983. The
Senate vote was 50-42 in favor, short of the two-thirds majority required for ratification.
Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1983, at 5, col. 1. The matter remains on the Senate calendar. See
129 CONG. REc. S2279 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983).
40. The liability limit for injury or loss of life presently is $75,000 per passenger,
pursuant to the Montreal Agreement. Under the agreement there is no limitation on
liability if the airline is guilty of willful misconduct. Thus, injured parties or heirs may
recover awards in excess of the $75,000 limit if they can prove willful misconduct on the
part of the carrier. Montreal Agreement, supra note I. In contrast, the Montreal Proto-
cols raise liability limits to approximately $317,000 ($117,000 of basic coverage plus
$200,000 from the supplemental plan) but eliminate the willful misconduct exception.
See Leigh, supra note 37, at 413-17; See also Wall St. J., Mar. 9, 1983, at 5, col. I.
Proponents of the Protocols argue that they would bring airline liability up to an accepta-
ble minimum level of compensation for loss of life. Moreover, the Protocols would
ensure quick and reliable recoveries through a settlement inducement clause designed to
force airlines to settle claims within six months. Finally, advocates contend that 85% of
all judgments would be covered by the $317,000 ceiling. Individuals who desire greater
coverage would be expected to provide for it with private insurance. Accordingly, the
Montreal Protocols are a worthwhile trade-off for participating in the Warsaw Conven-
tion. See Leigh, supra note 37, at 414-15.
Opponents level a variety of criticisms at the proposed change. For example, Senator
Ernest F. Hollings observes that under the Protocols, airline gross negligence or even
willful or blatant culpability would not matter in recovering damages. Furthermore,
American passengers on international flights would receive inadequate awards because a
wage earner's lifetime earnings would far exceed his potential recovery. Hollings argues
that establishing liability limits in favor of the airlines encourages suits against the gov-
ernment for air traffic control negligence and suits against aircraft manufacturers.
Finally, the Senator notes that removing the willful misconduct exception does violence
to the fundamental principle of tort law "that a wrongdoer pay for all the damages
caused by his deliberate and knowing actions." Hollings, The Montreal Protocols: A
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Not surprisingly, foreign municipal courts faced with this prob-
lem have reached divergent results. Some have taken the view that
the treaty's unit of conversion should be the modem French franc.
41
Others have held that the SDR will be the unit of conversion.42 Still
others have utilized the free market price of gold,43 or the official
Threat to the American System of Jurisprudence, 18 TRIAL 69, 70 (Sept. 1982). See also
Kriendler, Montreal Protocols Readyfor Vote, 189 N.Y.L.J. 44, at 1 (Mar. 7, 1983).
41. See, e.g., Judgment of Jan. 31, 1980, Cour D'appel, Paris, 1980, Recueil Peri-
odique et critique II, remanded March 7, 1983, Cour de cassation, Recueil Periodique et
Critique I, 23 (Chamie v. Egyptian) (Translation on file at the offices of the Cornell
International Law Journal). In Chamie the plaintiff sought to recover the value of three
pieces of baggage lost on a flight between Paris and Damascus, via Cairo. She estimated
the loss at 9,517 Lebanese pounds, but could not obtain payment. The airline offered to
settle the claim at $20 per kilogram, invoking Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention. In
determining what conversion factor to apply to the claim, the appellate court considered
an array of alternatives and concluded that the new franc in current use could be
regarded as equivalent in value to the French franc of 1926 without reference to gold.
The court felt that the current franc, as the successor to the Poincar franc, must be used
as the new unit of conversion. For a discussion of the case, see McGilchrist, supra note
14, at 167.
42. In Judgment of November 14, 1978, Corte de cassazione, (Rome) (Court of Last
Appeal) (Linee Aeree Italiane v. Riccioli) (translation on file at the offices of the Cornell
International Law Journal), the Italian court considered the question of which conver-
sion factor to apply in construing the Warsaw Convention. Plaintiff brought an action to
recover compensation for personal injuries sustained during a crash-landing. The court
found that it was no longer possible to determine the ratio between the gold content of
the lira and that of other currencies. This presumably was because gold no longer has an
official value on the world market. The court, however, was able to convert easily the
value of the Poincar& franc into Italian lira using the SDR as the conversion factor. The
court felt that this method best reflects the intention underlying the Warsaw Convention.
Similarly, in Judgment of May 1, 1981, Hoge Raad de Nederlanden, Rechtspraak van
de Week 321 (May 30, 1981) (Sup. Ct. of the Netherlands) (The Netherlands v. Giant
Shipping Corp.) (Translation on fie at the offices of the Cornell International Law Jour-
nal), the court found the SDR to be the most acceptable conversion factor. The court
construed the Brussels Convention, supra note 16, which expresses maritime liability lim-
its in Poincar francs. The Brussels Convention establishes uniform rules governing the
liability of maritime carriers engaged in international transportation. In finding the SDR
the proper unit of conversion, the court felt that the suitability of the franc as a generally
accepted calculation unit for the determination of international uniform liability limits
has been lost. The court found the SDR to be the clear successor to gold as the interna-
tional unit of conversion and consequently adopted it for purposes of the Brussels Con-
vention. For a discussion of this case, see McGilchrist, supra note 14, at 166.
Recently, two Austrian lower courts also have applied the SDR as the proper conver-
sion factor in constructing the liability limits of the Warsaw Convention. See Judgment
of June 30, 1983, District Court of Linz, Austria, 1983 (Breitlinger Gmbb v.Austrian
Airlines); Judgment of June 27, 1983, District Court of Vienna, Austria, 1983 (Kislinger
v. Austrian Airtransport) (Translations on file at the offices of the Cornell International
Law Journal).
43. A case cited frequently in support of the free market price of gold is Judgment of
Feb. 15, 1974, Court of Appeals, 3rd Dept., Athens, 1974 (Zakoupolos v. Olympic Air-
ways) (Translation on ifie at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal). In
Zakoupolos, an appeal was taken against the court of first instance which had converted
the Warsaw liability limits into the domestic currency using the free market price of gold.
The appellate court upheld the decision, based on the debates at the Hague Conference,
concluding that the parties intended to use the market price of gold since the official price
of gold cannot vary. Commentators argue that the minutes of the Hague Conference do
not support the court's conclusion. See Barlow, supra note 1, at 21. For a discussion of
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price of gold.44
Similar confusion has arisen in the United States. Despite the
Civil Aeronautics Board's espousal of the use of the "last official
price of gold,"'45 American courts have differed in their selection of a
unit of conversion. The United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Texas recently adopted the free market price of gold
as the unit of conversion.46 The Southern District of New York has
employed the French franc,47 while other courts in New York and
Illinois have selected the last official price of gold.4
II
FRANKLIN MINT CORP. v. TRANS WORLD
AIRLINES, INC.
Franklin Mint Corporation filed suit in federal district court
against Trans World Airlines (TWA) to recover the value of cargo
which was delivered to the carrier but which never arrived at its des-
tination.49 Although the shipment contained a large quantity of valu-
other foreign court cases upholding the free market price of gold, see id.; see also McGil-
christ, supra note 14, at 168-69.
44. For a discussion of court decisions in India and France which upheld use of the
official price of gold as the Warsaw Convention's conversion factor, see Barlow, supra
note 1, at 22-23; McGilchrist, supra note 14, at 166; Asser, supra note 14, at 652.
45. Congress delegated authority to the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) to regulate
international airline matters, including the management of tariffs set by airlines. 49
U.S.C. §§ 1374(a), 1382, 1386 (1976 & Supp. V. 1981). The CAB must exercise its powers
and duties consistently with the treaty obligations of the United States. See 49 U.S.C.
§ 1502 (Supp. V 1981). In an attempt to comply with this mandate, the CAB currently
espouses the use of the last official price of gold as the conversion standard to be used in
Warsaw Convention cases. See CAB Order 74-1-16, 39 Fed. Reg. 1526 (1974); CAB
Order 78-8-10, 43 Fed. Reg. 35971 (1978).
46. In Boehringer Manheim Diagnostics, Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, 531
F. Supp. 344, 349 (S.D. Tex. 1981), appealdocketed, No. 81-2519 (5th Cir. 1982), plaintiff
sought to recover against defendant airline under the Warsaw Convention for damage to
personal property that allegedly occurred during shipment. The court concluded that the
free market price of gold is the proper unit of conversion. "Allowing defendant to limit
its liability under the Convention based on the now-abolished 'official' gold price of
$42.22 an ounce would perpetrate a legal fiction of the purest kind." The Fifth Circuit
will likely reserve judgment on the appeal, pending the Supreme Court's resolution of the
conversion factor issue in Franklin Mint.
47. Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Alitalia Airlines, 15 AV.CAS. (CCH) 18,509, 18,513 n.9
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (The court took judicial notice of the valuation of the current French
franc at $.24 on October 2, 1980 and, without explanation, applied this as the conversion
unit).
48. Some courts have followed the current CAB interpretive orders, see supra note
45, and have applied the last official price of gold as the conversion unit. See In re
Aircrash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, 535 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), a f'd on other
grounds, 705 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1982); Deere & Co. v. Duetsche Lufthansa, No. 81 C 4726
(N.D. IMl. Dec. 30, 1982); Maschinenfabrik Kern v. Northwest Airlines Inc., 17 Av. CAs.
(CCH) 18,340 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
49. Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 1288 (S.D.N.Y.
1981), aft'd, 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 103 S.Ct. 3084 (1983). The cargo
was surrendered to TWA at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania for carriage to London. Id.
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able coins, 50 Franklin Mint made no special declaration of value at
the time of delivery.51 The parties agreed that the action was cov-
ered by the Warsaw Convention and that TWA was liable under
Article 18.52 Because there had been no special declaration of value,
TWA sought to limit its liability under Article 22.53 Difficulty arose,
however, in establishing a basis for converting the damage award
into U.S. dollars. Franklin Mint urged the court to convert the
recovery into dollars using the free market price of gold. TWA
argued that the court should adopt one of three other conversion
units: (1) the Special Drawing Right of the International Monetary
Fund; (2) the last official price of gold in the United States; or (3) the
exchange value of the modem French franc.
54
The district court held that although it found the arguments in
favor of the SDR persuasive, it was compelled to adopt the last offi-
cial price of gold in the United States as the conversion unit.55 The
court's brief opinion deferred to the expertise of the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board,56 which espouses this method.57
50. Id. at 1289. Franklin Mint fixed the full value of the cargo at $250,000.
51. Id. For transporting the cargo, TWA charged $544.96.
52. Id. Article 18 of the Convention provides:
(1) The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the
destruction or loss of or damage to, any checked baggage or any goods, if the
occurrence which caused the damage so sustained took place during the trans-
portation by air.
(2) The transportation by air within the meaning of the preceding paragraph
shall comprise the period during which the baggage or goods are in charge of the
carrier, whether in an airport or on board an aircraft, or, in the case of a landing
outside an airport, in any place whatsoever.
(3) The period of the transportation by air shall not extend to any transporta-
tion by land, by sea, or by river performed outside an airport. If, however, such
transportation takes place in the performance of a contract for transportation by
air, for the purpose of loading, delivery, or transshipment, any damage is pre-
sumed, subject to proof to the contrary, to have been the result of an event which
took place during the transportation by air.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 18.
53. 535 F. Supp. at 1289. For the provisions of Article 22 see supra note 11.
54. 535 F. Supp. at 1289. For a discussion of the four proposed alternatives, see infra
notes 121-83 and accompanying text.
55. 535 F. Supp. at 1289.
56. Id. The court reasoned:
TWA's second suggestion (the last official price of gold in the United States)
has-arguably, at least-been espoused by the Civil Aeronautics Board
("CAB"), the government agency most intimately concerned with the transaction
at hand. It therefore comes as close as anything to constituting a governmental
interpretation of the Article 22 limitation. Also, it is used by all domestic carri-
ers-including TWA-in calculating the dollar value of the Article 22 limitation
printed on their tariffs. It would seem to follow that the parties intended to
adopt the last official price of gold as the basis for converting the Article 22
limitation into dollars in the instant case.
Id. For a discussion of the official price of gold, see infra notes 137-57 and accompany-
ing text.
57. See supra note 45 and infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
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The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the district
court's use of the last official price of gold as a basis for conversion in
the instant case.58 Notwithstanding the disposition of the case at
hand, the court found the Warsaw Convention's limits on liability
for loss of cargo unenforceable in United States courts.59 The ruling
was prospective and applied to events creating liability sixty days
after the decision.6 0
Franklin Mint presented the court with the opportunity to estab-
lish a unit of conversion for claims arising under the Warsaw Con-
vention within the Second Circuit. The court could have
prospectively affirmed the standard set by the district court, chosen
one of the alternatives proffered by the parties, or devised a new
standard. Instead, it held invalid the liability limits of the
Convention.
In its analysis, the Second Circuit focused on the inadequacies
of the suggested alternatives and on its perceived inability to make a
selection even if an appropriate unit of conversion were available.6l
The court concluded that adoption of any one of the alternatives
would be inappropriate and against the express purpose of the Con-
vention.6 2 The court noted that for almost two generations liability
limits had been easily ascertainable through a simple formula using
the official price of gold. But "[a]n essential ingredient of that
formula [had], as a consequence of international action followed by
domestic legislation, ceased to exist."'63 The court next considered its
power to select, as a matter of policy, a new unit of conversion. It
reasoned that because Congress explicitly abandoned the gold stan-
dard and had not substituted another standard, United States courts
could not assume a legislative role and impose a new unit of
conversion.64
58. 690 F.2d at 312.
59. Id. at 311.
60. Id. at 311-12.
61. See id. at 308-11.
62. See id. at 305-06. In rejecting each of the four proffered alternatives, the court
stated:
[There are powerful arguments against each of the proffered solutions. The last
official price of gold is a price which has been explicitly repealed by Congress.
[citations omitted]. It thus lacks any status in law or relationship to contempo-
rary currency values. The free market price of gold is the highly volatile price of
a commodity determined in part by forces of supply and demand unrelated to
currency values. SDR's are a creature of the IMF, modified at will by the body
and having no basis in the convention. The French franc is simply one domestic
currency, subject to change by the unilateral act of a single government.
Id. at 305-06.
63. Id. at 311.
64. Id. According to the court's analysis, "treaty advice and consent and proposal is
the province of the executive and ratification is the exclusive province of the United
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A critical factor in the decision is the court's awareness of the
confusion plaguing the Warsaw Convention's liability limits. The
court noted that the lack of an internationally agreed upon unit of
conversion has caused disarray among foreign and domestic
courts.65 The court refused to add to the existing confusion by intro-
ducing yet another conversion standard for the Second Circuit. By
finding that it had no authority, from either the Convention or
domestic law, to select a new unit of conversion, the Second Circuit
highlighted the seriousness of the problem and attempted to set the
stage for prompt congressional action.66
III
ANALYSIS
Four factors undermine the Second Circuit's holding and analy-
sis in Franklin Mint. First, the conflict between the Warsaw Conven-
tion, a treaty of the United States, and the repeal of the Par Value
Modification Act did not constitute an irreconcilable difference
between two statutes of the United States. Consequently, the court
had a duty to construe them consistently and thereby to give effect to
both laws. Second, the court lacked the power to declare the Con-
vention's liability limits unenforceable in United States courts.
Treaty abrogation and modification are within the exclusive domain
of the executive and legislative branches of government. Third, the
Second Circuit failed to give effect to the intent of the Convention's
drafters. Finally, the court's decision undermines a system that is
vital to the international aviation industry and to international com-
merce in general.
A. DUTY TO GIVE EFFECT TO BOTH STATUTES
The Second Circuit violated its duty to interpret two statutes of
the United States consistently. As a treaty of the United States, the
Warsaw Convention is part of the law of the land, equivalent to an
States Senate." (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1). The court felt that selection of a
new unit of conversion is "plainly a matter to be negotiated by the parties" to the Con-
vention. 609 F.2d at 311.
65. 609 F.2d at 309.
66. At the time Franklin Mint came before the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit, the Montreal Protocols were scheduled for debate on the Senate floor. The Second
Circuit's decision appears, in part, to have been a prelude to the subsequent Senate vote;
a plea to the legislative branch to adopt the Protocols which have been languishing since
1977. Adoption of the Montreal Protocols would have ended the confusion because they
substitute the SDR as the unit of conversion. As subsequent events revealed, the attempt
to influence the vote, if indeed such was the court's intent, failed because the Senate did
not adopt the Protocols. For a discussion of the Montreal Protocols, see supra note 40.
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act of the legislature.67 When Congress enacts a law that conflicts
with an existing treaty, a problem of enforcement arises. The pri-
mary difficulty is encountered within municipal courts when the
issue becomes which law to apply. The Supreme Court addressed
this problem in Whitney v. Robertson68 and held that courts must
strive to give effect to both laws.69 Only if the two are totally incon-
sistent will the more recent control.70
In Franklin Mint, the Second Circuit faced such a conflict. The
court was confronted with two seemingly inconsistent statutes:
(1) the Warsaw Convention; and (2) the repeal of the Par Value
Modification Act.71 While the abolition of the official price of gold
conflicted with the operation and language of the Convention, the
Second Circuit could have construed the statutes consistently and
given effect to both. In fact, under Whitney, the court had a duty to
see that both mandates were fulfilled. There was no irreconcilable
conflict between the treaty and the municipal legislative act. In
repealing the Par Value Modification Act, Congress did not give any
indication that it sought to make the liability limits of the Warsaw
Convention unenforceable in United States courts. 72 Two conclu-
sions can be drawn: (1) that Congress intended to repeal the use of
the official price of gold;73 and (2) that Congress intended that the
United States continue to fulfill its treaty obligations under the War-
saw Convention.74 Thus, the court, pursuant to Whitney, was obli-
67. Generally, a treaty is a contract between two or more states which is executed by
the sovereign power of the parties. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829)
(upholding validity of treaty between Spain and the United States). In the United States,
treaties are part of domestic law. The Constitution states that "all Treaties made...
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land." U.S.
CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. They are considered equivalent to acts of the legislature when their
provisions require no legislation to make them operative. Foster, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314.
Treaties with such provisions are called "self-executing." For a discussion of self-execut-
ing treaties, see L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION, 156-61 (1972).
The Warsaw Convention is a self-executing treaty. It required no legislative action to
become effective in 1934. Thus, it became part of the law of the land on adoption. See
Indemnity Insurance Co. of North America v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 58 F. Supp.
338 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (Warsaw Convention found to be self-executing based on its terms).
68. 124 U.S. 190 (1888) (Court construed provisions of the treaty of 1867 with the
Dominican Republic in an action to recover duties alleged to have been exacted
illegally).
69. Id. at 194.
70. Id.
71. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text. An express indication to the con-
trary clearly would have made the statute and the Warsaw Convention irreconcilable
and would have required the application of rule that the more recent law is controlling.
See supra text accompanying note 70.
73. See infra notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
74. The Department of State still regards the Warsaw Convention as a binding inter-
national agreement. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE 207-08 (1982) [here-
I
WARSAW CONVENTION
gated to select an alternative unit of conversion that would give
effect to both statutes.75
The court's decision was also inconsistent with other precedents
requiring that the intent to modify or abrogate a treaty be clearly
expressed on the face of the statute. In Lem Moon Sing v. United
States,76 the Supreme Court declared that "it is the duty of the
courts not to construe an act of Congress as modifying or annulling a
treaty made with another nation, unless its words clearly and plainly
point to such a construction." 77 The Court reiterated this doctrine in
Cook v. United States,78 when it stated that "[a] treaty will not be
deemed to have been abrogated or modified by a later statute unless
such purpose on the part of Congress has been clearly expressed. '79
In the light of these principles, the Second Circuit violated its
duty to interpret the repeal of the Par Value Modification Act con-
sistently with the Warsaw Convention. If Congress had intended to
render the liability limits of the Convention unenforceable, it could
have stated its intention expressly. "[Tihe intention to abrogate or
modify a treaty is not. . lightly imputed to the Congress." 80 The
Second Circuit had an available alternative that would have been
consistent with the purposes of both statutes and would have pre-
vented the confusion that its decision engendered. 81
B. POWER TO DECLARE THE TREATY UNENFORCEABLE
The Second Circuit does not have the power to declare the War-
saw Convention's liability provisions unenforceable. The United
States Constitution reserves to the executive and legislative branches
the power to make treaties, 82 but it does not indicate how they may
be terminated. In The Amiable Isabella, 83 however, Justice Story set
forth the principle that "the obligations of [a] treaty [cannot] be
changed or varied but by the same formalities with which they were
inafter cited as DEP'T OF STATE]. For additional evidence of United States government
support for the treaty, see infra note 106.
75. The parties in the suit offered three alternatives to the last official price of gold.
For discussion of each, see infra notes 122-83 and accompanying text.
76. 158 U.S. 538 (1895).
77. Id. at 549.
78. 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
79. Id. at 120.
80. Pigeon River Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S.
138, 160 (1934) (holding that, whenever possible, subsequent acts of Congress are to be
construed consistently with treaty provisions to avoid abrogating or modifying a treaty).
81. See infra notes 158-83 and accompanying text.
82. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 provides:
"[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present con-
cur.... Id.
83. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 1 (1821).
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introduced; or at least by some act of as high an import, and of as
unequivocal an authority. '8 4 In another instance, the Supreme
Court held that "courts of justice have no right to annul or disregard
... [treaty] provisions, unless they violate the Constitution .... *"85
Accordingly, it is the judiciary's duty to interpret and administer
treaties in conformity with their terms.86
Subsequent decisions have expanded upon this doctrine and
have established a degree of flexibility in courts' powers to interpret
and apply treaties. Some have held that a treaty's purpose should
not be thwarted by a change in circumstances.87 "For a court to
view a treaty as frozen in the year of its creation is scarcely more
justifiable than to regard the Constitutional clock as forever stopped
in 1787." 88 Others have stressed that the provisions of a treaty
"should never become a 'verbal prison'. ' 89 They should be "liber-
ally construed so as to effect the apparent intention of the parties." 90
The principles enunciated by these authorities establish that,
absent a violation of the Constitution 9' or an irreconcilable conflict
between a treaty and a subsequent statute,92 courts should not
declare a treaty provision unenforceable. Even when there has been
a violation of treaty obligations by another signatory, it is the prerog-
ative of the executive and legislative branches to determine when a
treaty is no longer binding on the United States.93
84. Id. at 75.
85. Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853) (annex to treaty held as valid
provision of treaty, absent constitutional infirmity, where both sides ratified the treaty
including the annex); see also Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194-95; Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S.
270 (1902) (holding that question of whether power remains in foreign state to carry out
its treaty obligations is for the political departments to decide, not the courts).
86. Doe, 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 657.
87. Day v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 528 F.2d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 890 (1976), reh ' denied 429 U.S. 1124 (1976) (in determining whether Warsaw
Convention applies to a set of facts not anticipated by drafters, courts should consider
legislative history, parties' conduct subsequent to ratification, and genuine, shared expec-
tations of parties).
88. Id.
89. Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc., 360 F.2d 804, 812 (2d Cir. 1966) (construing
venue provision relating to airline's place of business to include airlines which confirm
through foreign offices but maintain offices in the United States).
90. Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 51-52 (1929) (treaty construction by courts need
not be as liberal when treaty confficts with state, as opposed to federal, statute).
91. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
93. For example, in Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913), petitioner appealed from
a judgment dismissing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus and remanding for extradi-
tion to Italy. The petitioner sought to block the extradition on the grounds that Italy had
refused to surrender its nationals to United States authorities pursuant to an extradition
treaty signed by both countries. The Court held that although Italy's actions might
render the treaty denounceable by the United States, they did not render it void and of
no effect. It found that where the Executive elects to waive any right to free itself from
the obligations of a treaty, it is the duty of the courts to give effect to the Executive's will.
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In Franklin Mint, the Second Circuit did not address the consti-
tutionality of the Warsaw Convention.94 Nor was the court con-
fronted with an irreconcilable conflict between a treaty and a
municipal statute.95 The court, therefore, was obliged to enforce the
Convention and to find a suitable unit of conversion that would give
effect to both mandates.96
In its attempt to avoid infringing on the legislature,97 the Sec-
ond Circuit did precisely what it sought not to do. By holding that
the Convention liability limits for loss of cargo are unenforceable in
the United States, the court made a pronouncement which falls
squarely within the domain of Congress. The court failed to recog-
nize that it had the power to select a suitable unit of conversion.
Such a selection would not have violated the separation of powers
doctrine; rather, it would have been in conformity with the judici-
ary's role of reconciling statutory differences and with well-settled
principles of treaty interpretation. 98
94. The constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention has been challenged unsuccess-
fully on several occasions. See, e.g., In re Aircrash in Bali Indonesia on April 22, 1974,
684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982) (Warsaw Convention upheld against fifth amendment chal-
lenge where federal government can pay just compensation for liability limits); Pierre v.
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 486 (D.N.J. 1957) (Warsaw Convention's liability
limits do not violate right to jury trial).
95. See supra notes 67-81 and accompanying text.
96. The United States has not expressed a desire to abandon its obligations under the
Warsaw Convention. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
97. In a footnote, the Second Circuit explained its position as follows:
Given the lack of an internationally agreed upon standard of conversion, it
might be argued that the convention has been abrogated. However, treaties
involve international obligations entered into by coordinate branches of the gov-
ernment and it is not the province of courts to declare treaties abrogated or to
afford relief to those (including the parties) who wish to escape their terms.
These are not matters for 'judicial cognizance' (quoting Whitney v. Robertson,
124 U.S. at 194). They belong to the executive and legislative departments
because they are more properly the domain of 'diplomacy and legislation, .
not. . . the administration of laws' (quoting Whitney, 124 U.S. at 195).
690 F.2d at 311 n.26.
98. In addition to the cases already mentioned where courts have applied a conver-
sion standard, supra notes 41-44 & 46-48 and accompanying text, opinions have been
rendered on numerous other issues not addressed specifically by the treaty. For example,
in Block v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 386 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
392 U.S. 905 (1968), the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit considered the issue of
whether a charter flight was governed by the provisions of the Warsaw Convention. The
plaintiff argued that because the Convention was silent on the matter, the drafters must
have intended to exclude charter flights from its coverage. In rejecting this argument and
recognizing the broad purpose of the Convention to limit air carrier liability, the court
reasoned: "[hiad the Warsaw framers intended to create an exception for charter flights it
is difficult to see why they did not include a specific provision in the Convention.. "
Id. at 329.
In Reed, 555 F.2d at 1089, the Second Circuit faced the issue of whether plaintiffs
could recover, from the air carrier's employees, a sum greater than that permitted by the
Convention. In construing the purpose of the treaty, the court concluded that the liabil-
itj limitation of $75,000 per passenger applied to employees as well as to carriers and
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C. DUTY TO INTERPRET THE CONVENTION CONSISTENT WITH
THE INTENT OF THE PARTIES
The Second Circuit failed to interpret the Warsaw Convention
in accordance with the intent of its drafters. The decision in Franklin
Mint disregarded the established principle that treaties are to be con-
strued liberally to give effect to the intention of the parties.99 It also
gave little consideration to the conduct of the signatories subsequent
to the ratification of the treaty. 100
The drafters sought to establish a uniform system of rules which
would govern international air commerce.' 0' They wanted to limit
air carrier liability and formulated Article 22 for that very pur-
pose. 02 Subsequent amendments to the Convention reveal that
although there has been some discontent, the parties have consist-
ently supported liability limits.10 3 In addition, present international
that the limit was absolute. The court stated: "[t]o permit a suit for an unlimited amount
of damages against a carrier's employees for personal injuries to a passenger would
unquestionably undermine [the] purpose behind Article 22, since it would permit plain-
tiffs to recover from the carrier through its employees damages in excess of the Conven-
tion's limits." Id. at 1089.
The court's reasoning in Franklin Mint endangers not only the Warsaw Convention
but also all international agreements. It is unreasonable to expect the drafters of treaties
to expressly state all possible permutations that may become troublesome in the future.
Moreover, to require that the legislature make a pronouncement on every change that
occurs subsequent to treaty ratification is equally unreasonable. The legislative process
often is too slow to respond to the vicissitudes of international law. To require this of
Congress would virtually paralyze the United States' ability to meet its international
obligations.
99. One of the earliest pronouncements of this principle was made by Justice Story in
The Amiable Isabella, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 71:
mhis Court does not possess any treaty-making power. That power belongs by
the constitution to another department of the Government; and to alter, amend,
or add to any treaty, by inserting any clause, whether small or great, important
or trivial would be on our part, an usurpation of power, and not an exercise of
judicial function. It would be to make, and not to construe a treaty. Neither can
this Court supply a casms omissus in a treaty, anymore than in a law. We are to
find out the intention of the parties by just rules of interpretation applied to the
subject matter, and having found that, our duty is to follow it as far as it goes,
and stop where that stops-whatever may be the imperfections or difficulties
which it leaves behind.
See also Neilsen . Johnson, 279 U.S. at 51-52 (1929); Valentine v.United States, 299 U.S.
5, 10 (1936) (finding that it was not the intention of the drafters of an extradition treaty
between the United States and France to give the executive branch broad discretion to
extradite United States citizens); Sumitomo Shoji of America v. Avagliano, 475 U.S. 176,
185 (1982) (friendship, commerce and navigation treaty between Japan and the United
States held not intended to include wholly owned local subsidiaries of foreign
companies).
100. In Day, 528 F.2d at 35, the court observed: "The conduct of the parties subse-
quent to ratification of a treaty may. . . be relevant in ascertaining the proper construc-
tion to accord the treaty's various provisions." See also Pigeon River Improvement, Slide
& Boom Co., 291 U.S. at 158-63.
I01. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 11.
103. See supra notes 1 & 40.
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commitment to the Warsaw system remains steadfast. Foreign deci-
sions demonstrate that all foreign municipal courts to date have
enforced the Convention. While there has been disagreement on the
proper unit of conversion, foreign courts have always selected and
applied one of the available alternatives. 1°4 Many foreign govern-
ments also have passed domestic legislation to resolve the conversion
problem.105
United States support for the Convention is equally strong.
Neither the Executive nor Congress has indicated that the United
States no longer supports the Convention. 0 6 Moreover, the legisla-
tive history of the statute repealing the Par Value Modification Act
does not reveal any congressional dissatisfaction with the Warsaw
system.107
It is perplexing that the Second Circuit chose to overlook the
past and present intentions of the parties to limit air carrier liability.
The court had a duty to give effect to those intentions. 10 8 The realm
of foreign affairs is traditionally reserved to the Executive and to
Congress, not to the courts.
104. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
105. For a list of statutes enacted by Denmark, Finland, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Israel, New Zealand, Norway, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands to
establish a local currency equivalent of the Poincarb franc, see Barlow, supra note 1, at 3-
4 n.12.
106. See DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 74. In addition, the report of the United States
delegation to the Montreal Conference in 1975 reveals that the United States was a chief
proponent of the SDR in the Montreal Protocols. See Detailed Report of the U.S. Delega-
tion on the International Conference on Air Law, (Montreal Sept. 1975) (copy of report
available at offices of the Cornell International Law Journal). Recently, a report of the
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Legal Committee acknowledged that
the Reagan Administration supports ratification of the Montreal Protocols. ICAO Legal
Committee, Report ofAgenda Item 6, (Montreal), ICAO Doc. 9397-LC/185 (April 12-25,
1983) [hereinafter cited as ICAO Report]. Evidence of this commitment also may be
found in the United States Solicitor General's filing of an amicus curiae brief urging the
United States Supreme Court to grant a writ of certiorari in the Franklin Mint case. The
government takes the position that the treaty should not have been held unenforceable
and that either the official price of gold or the SDR should have been adopted as the unit
of conversion. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae In Support Of Writ Of
Certiorari, Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 690 F.2d 303 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. granted, 103 S.Ct. 3084 (1983), at 14-17 [hereinafter cited as U.S. Brief].
Although the United States Senate withheld its consent to the Montreal Protocols by a
vote of 50-42, the Majority Leader moved for reconsideration, and the matter remains on
the Senate Calendar. See supra note 39. 129 Cong. Rec. S2279 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 1983).
For a discussion of the Senate vote on the Protocols, see Kreindler, Montreal Protocols
Defeated, 189 N.Y.L.J. 67, at I (Apr. 4, 1983).
107. See S. REP. No. 1295, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5935. See also infra notes 144-49 and accompanying text.
108. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text.
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D. IMPLICATIONS
The court's decision in Franklin Mint, if upheld, will have a
serious impact upon the international aviation community and upon
the United States' future ability to honor its international commit-
ments. Judicial disruption of the Warsaw Convention, without
express authority from the Executive and Congress, will have conse-
quences beyond those perceived by the Second Circuit.
First, the decision, in effect, abolishes the limits on liability for
loss or damage to cargo. Because all other parties have consistently
enforced the Convention, 0 9 future plaintiffs will be encouraged to
bring suit in the United States, where liability limits will not be
enforced. Article 28 of the Convention facilitates forum shopping by
providing litigants with a number of fora in which to bring claims."l0
United States courts may be confronted with cases that might have
been instituted elsewhere. The potential increase in litigation cannot
be dismissed lightly given the volume of international air traffic that
flows to and from the United States."'
Second, although Franklin Mint only involved loss of cargo, the
court's decision casts serious doubt upon the Convention's liability
limits for personal injury. If limits for loss of cargo are unenforce-
able because a suitable unit of conversion no longer exists, then all
other limits converted in the same manner must also be unenforce-
able. In fact, the District Court for the Central District of California
took this position in In re Aircrash at Kimpo International Airport
Korea. " 2 Relying exclusively on Franklin Mint, the district court
held that without an internationally agreed upon unit of conversion,
a rational limit on liability for personal injury or death cannot
exist."13
109. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text; see also supra note 105.
110. See supra note 3.
111. See ICAO Report, supra note 106, at 6-2. This is not to deny that courts may
dismiss suits onforum non convenlens grounds. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S.
235 (1981) (upholding dismissal of suit brought for damages arising out of air crash that
took place in Scotland). Nevertheless, removal of the Convention's liability limits will
undoubtedly increase the attractiveness of U.S. courts.
112. 17 Av. CAS. (CCH) 18,097 (C.D. Cal. 1983). Kimpo involved claims for the
death of several passengers on a Korean Air Lines flight from the United States to Korea.
The issues before the court were: (1) whether the Warsaw Convention limits the damages
recoverable for death of a passenger in an accident involving an international air carrier;
and (2) the proper method of calculating damages if the Convention was applied. For a
discussion of the case, see McGilchrist, Limitation of Liability Under the Warsaw Conven-
tion-Further Developments in the U.S., LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L. Q. 308, 311 (1983).
113. The district court reasoned:
It is clearly established that the airlines knew that "a rational limit on liability
cannot exist" without an internationally agreed upon unit and "the Montreal
meeting in 1975 was a recognition by the Warsaw parties that the Convention's
unit had been eliminated." Therefore, airlines, including Korean, presumptively
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Third, the court's decision subjects the United States Govern-
ment to potential retaliation from other parties to the treaty. By
adopting the Warsaw Convention, the parties agreed to enforce its
provisions within their respective municipal courts. Part of that
agreement was to limit the liability of air carriers engaged in interna-
tional transport. The failure of United States courts to enforce the
agreement constitutes a breach of an international covenant, which
other parties may invoke as grounds for terminating or suspending
their own treaty obligations. 14 Indeed, the ramifications of uphold-
ing Franklin Mint may be even more severe. Because the power to
modify, terminate, or abrogate a treaty rests exclusively with the
executive and the legislature, 1 5 the decision of the Second Circuit in
no way alters the United States' international obligations under the
knew that this "international disarray" would prevent the Convention from
shielding them in any rational manner, and they would be expected to protect
themselves and obtain additional insurance.
Furthermore, the knowledge of this "international disarray" and the "recogni-
tion by the Warsaw parties that the Convention's unit had been eliminated by
events," contrary to the holding in Franklin Mint, would allow the airlines to
see-as early as 1975--that, eventually, a court would refuse to enforce the Con-
vention.
558 F. Supp. 72, 75 (C.D. Cal. 1983), 17 Av. CAS. (CCH) at 18,100.
114. Article 60(2) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides:
2. A material breach of a multilateral treaty by one of the parties entitles:
(a) the other parties by unanimous agreement to suspend the operation of the
treaty in whole or in part or to terminate it either:
(i) in the relations between themselves and the defaulting state; or
(ii) as between all the parties.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (1969), reprinted
in L. HENKIN, BASIC DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT To INTERNATIONAL LAW, CASES AND
MATERIALS 281 (1980).
Under Article 60(3) a material breach of a treaty is defined as:
(a) a repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention; or
(b) the violation of a provision essential to the accomplishment of the object or
purpose of the treaty.
Id.
The Vienna Convention was adopted at the U.N. Conference on the Law of Treaties in
1969. It came into effect on January 27, 1980 upon ratification by the 35th country.
Although the Convention has not been ratified by the United States, the Department of
State has acknowledged that, "the Convention is already generally recognized as the
authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice." See Letter from Secretary of State
William P. Rogers to the President, (October 18, 1971), SEN. EXEC. Doc. L., 92d Cong.,
Ist Sess. 1 (1971). The reference was only to the substantive provisions of the Conven-
tion. The final provisions dealing with procedures for dispute resolution are only bind-
ing on the parties to the Convention. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 122 (1962).
The Solicitor General indicated in his amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court that
several foreign governments have expressed the view that the decision of the Second
Circuit will seriously affect United States relations in international aviation. See U.S.
Brief, supra note 106, at 2.
115. See supra notes 82-98 and accompanying text.
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treaty.116 The Convention will remain in force until the United
States government complies with proper procedure to withdraw.' 1 7
In the meantime, the government of the United States may be held
liable at international law for a recovery from a foreign international
air carrier in excess of the Convention's limits.'" 8
116. In a communication regarding expropriation, Secretary of State Hughes declared
in 1922:
It is, of course, true that a Nation may by its Constitution and its laws override
treaties, but by such domestic acts, however sanctioned nationally, it cannot
escape its international duties and obligations. The fact that a Nation exerts its
power through its organs of government to commit a breach of a treaty engage-
ment in no way permits it to avoid the international consequences of such a
breach.
Communication to the Charge d'Affairs in Mexico, April 15, 1922, quoted in 2 C. HYDE,
INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES
1464 (2d rev. ed. 1947), reprinted in 14 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
316 (1970).
The Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Laws of the United States incor-
porates this basic principle. Section 145 provides:
Effect of Subsequent Act of Congress on International Agreement
(1) An act of Congress enacted after an international agreement of the
United States becomes effective, that is inconsistent with the agreement, super-
sedes it as domestic law of the United States, if the purpose of Congress to super-
sede the agreement is clearly expressed.
(2) The superseding of the agreement as domestic law of the United States
by subsequent act of Congress does not affect the international obligations of the
United States under the agreement.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 145
(1962); see also id. at § 140.
117. The procedures for formally denouncing the Warsaw Convention are stipulated
in Article 39 as follows:
(1) Any one of the High Contracting Parties may denounce this convention
by a notification addressed to the Government of the Republic of Poland, which
shall at once inform the Government of each of the High Contracting Parties.
(2) Denunciation shall take effect six months after the notification of denun-
ciation, and shall operate only as regards the party which shall have proceeded
to denunciation.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 39. The United States Government used these
procedures in 1965 when it sought to denounce the treaty. For a discussion of these
events, see Kreindler, Denunciation of the Warsaw Convention, 31 J. AIR L. & CoM. 219
(1965); see also Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note I, at 551.
118. Violation of a treaty gives rise to a duty to make reparations. In 1934, the Perma-
nent Court of International Justice (the predecessor to the International Court of Justice)
stated:
It is a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves
an obligation to make reparation in an adequate form. Reparation therefore is
an indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is no
necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself. Case Concerning the Fac-
tory at Chorz6w (jurisdiction) (Ger. v. Pol0.) 1927 P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 8 at 21
(Judgment of July 26).
In addition, commentary to the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law of the
United States provides that, "[t]he satisfaction of a claim for a violation of international
law, or "reparation", as this satisfaction is usually called, may take many forms. The
most common form of reparations is the payment of damages." RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 3, comment (O, at 11(1962). Many foreign airlines are either partially or wholly owned by their governments.
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Finally, the Franklin Mint holding will heighten international
confusion if the decision stands. The certainty and uniformity
sought by the drafters and parties will be undermined if the Conven-
tion's provisions are no longer enforced."19 In addition, air carriers
and investors will be exposed to a multitude of domestic laws
throughout the world, inevitably increasing risks and operating costs
which will then be passed to consumers. American passengers trav-
eling abroad on foreign carriers may also encounter a panoply of
foreign air carrier liability laws which may not adequately protect
their interests. These implications should be of substantial interest
to the United States because of its volume of international air traffic
and the number of its citizens that travel abroad.120
IV
THE FOUR ALTERNATIVES
The parties in Franklin Mint presented the court with four alter-
native units of conversion that could have been used to give effect to
both the Convention and the repeal of the Par Value Modification
Act. These were: (1) the market value of gold; (2) the modem
French franc; (3) the last official price of gold in the United States;
and (4) the IMF's SDR. 121 Although the Second Circuit rejected
these as incapable of fulfilling the objectives of the Convention, a
closer analysis reveals that the court should have adopted the SDR.
A. THE MARKET VALUE OF GOLD
Gold was selected in 1929 as the Convention's standard because
it was the existing international unit of conversion.'2 2 Defining
recovery judgments in terms of gold provided the stability and uni-
formity desired by the drafters. Because gold has become a volatile
commodity,' 23 it can no longer serve its intended function under the
Convention. For example, the price of gold on the open market rose
in January 1980 to $850 per ounce. By the following April, it had
plunged below $500, only to rise again to $700 per ounce by Septem-
A recovery against a foreign international air carrier in excess of the Convention's liabil-
ity limits may be equivalent to a recovery against the foreign government itself.
119. For example, should other countries denounce the Convention, the advantage of
shipping on a single airway bill anywhere in the world may be lost. See Warsaw Con-
vention, supra note 1, at § 3.
120. The decision in Franklin Mint is inconsistent with the general objectives set by
Congress for the American aviation industry. Seegenerally 49 U.S.C. § 1502(b) (Supp. V
1981) (formulation of broad goals for encouragement and development of international
air carrier industry).
121. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
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ber 1980. Between January 5 and January 29, 1981, the market price
of gold fell from $600 to less than $500 per ounce. 24 Such dramatic
fluctuations demonstrate that the market price of gold cannot pro-
vide the stability and uniformity contemplated by the drafters of the
Convention. Moreover, use of this standard would result in recov-
eries far in excess of those envisioned by the parties.
Numerous commentators have concluded that the market value
of gold must be rejected. 25 International organizations addressing
the issue have reached the same conclusion.126 Finally, and perhaps
most significantly, leading foreign courts have expressly discarded
the market value of gold, finding it devoid of any significance as an
international unit of conversion. 27 Thus, if deference is to be given
to the intent of the drafters, 28 the market value of gold should be
rejected as the standard for converting the liability limits of the War-
saw Convention.
124. N.Y. Times, Jan. 30, 1981, at DI, col. 4.
125. One authority comments:
[T]here is one substantial argument against the use of the free market price of
gold. It is submitted that the purpose of Article 22 would not be served by using
this price because it is clear from the proceedings of the Warsaw conference that
the delegates wanted to protect the compromise they had reached from uncon-
trolled variations which would have emptied it of all substance. At the time,
they were particularly concerned about the risk of seeing the limits of liability,
originally expressed in French francs, without any other precision, being altered
by a mere change in the definition of the currency unilaterally decided by the
French Government for reasons totally unrelated to air carriers' liability. This is
why the draft was altered and the definitive text made to specify that the franc
used in the Convention consisted 65-1/2 milligrames gold of millesimal fineness
900, that is, the French franc as it had just been officially defined in 1929. The
purpose of the drafters would be thwarted if the free market price of gold were to
be used, since it would introduce wide and uncontrolled variations into the
whole scheme.
G. MILLER, LIABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 179 (1977) [footnote omit-
ted]; see also J. Gold, Floating Currencies, SDJRs and Gold, 22 IMF PAMPHLET SERIES 56
(1977); Asser, supra note 14, at 663. For a discussion of the views of commentators
favoring the use of the market value of gold, see Barlow, supra note 1, at 15. Barlow
herself observes, however, that the argument in favor of the market value of gold may be
based on a false premise. Id. at 17.
126. For example, a resolution issued by the ICAO Legal Committee, see supra note
106, opposes the use of the commodity price of gold as a unit of conversion for purposes
of the Warsaw Convention. See ICAO Doc. 9131-LC/173-1, at 2 (1976).
127. See Judgment of May 1, 1981 (Giant Shipping Corp.), supra note 42. The Dutch
court held that as a result of dramatic changes in the international monetary system, gold
could no longer be utilized to set uniform liability limits under the Brussels Convention.
See also Judgment of Jan. 31, 1980 (Chamie), supra note 41 (French court, in determin-
ing what conversion factor to apply to a claim under the Warsaw Convention, adopted
the current French franc); Judgment of Nov. 14, 1978 (Pakistan InternationalAirlines),
supra note 44 (French court applied the official price of gold as the conversion unit in a
suit under the Warsaw Convention).
128. Settled principles of treaty interpretation require this. See supra notes 99-100
and accompanying text.
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B. THE MODERN FRENCH FRANC
Because the Warsaw Convention relies on the Poincar franc, 129
litigants have proffered its successor, the modem French franc, as an
alternative for converting the Convention's liability limits. 130 Propo-
nents of this view argue that, as a conversion medium, the modem
franc is superior to the market value of gold. 131 Moreover, decisions
in both United States 132 and foreign 33 courts have adopted the franc
as a unit of conversion.
The major flaw in using the modem French franc, however, is
that it is a national currency subject to unpredictable unilateral read-
justments. In essence, adoption of the franc as a unit of conversion
leaves the Convention's liability limits subject to the will of the
French government. A similar proposal made during the second
drafting conference was rejected by Switzerland on these grounds. 34
Thus, like the market value of gold, the modern French franc does
not comport with the intent of the Warsaw parties to establish a sta-
ble and uniform system to limit the liability of international air car-
riers.135 If the judiciary is to give effect to the intentions of the
parties, 136 the French franc should also be rejected as a unit of
conversion.
C. THE LAST OFFICIAL PRICE OF GOLD IN THE UNITED STATES
The existing legislative conflict also has led parties to propose
the "last official price of gold" as a unit of conversion. This value
was set at $42.22 per troy ounce and was the accepted unit of conver-
sion in Warsaw Convention cases prior to the repeal of the Par
129. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
130. 690 F.2d at 305.
131. TWA offered the current French franc as a possible conversion factor, arguing
that it is more stable than the market price of gold. Franklin Mint Corp., 525 F. Supp. at
1289.
132. See Kinney Shoe Corp., 15 Av. CAS. (CCH) 18,509 (court, without explanation,
applied the current French franc as the conversion unit).
133. See Judgment of Jan. 31, 1980 (Chamie), supra note 41.
134. The Swiss delegate to the drafting Conference, stated:
Naturally, when we prepared our text, the French franc was variable, it has been
stabilized since. But the fact that a currency has been stabilized does not imply
that it is a final thing; a law can always modify another law. For this reason, in
Switzerland, we have preferred to stick to the gold standard... . We would not
be opposed to refer to the French franc, that is to say, based on a weight of gold
at such and such one thousandth.
Naturally, one can say "French franc" but the French franc, it's your national
law which determines it and one need have only a modification of the national
law to overturn the essence of this provision.
Aeronautical Law Conference Minutes, supra note 1, at 89-90 (statement of M. Pittar).
135. See supra notes 99-108 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
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Value Modification Act.137
Proponents marshal three arguments in favor of this standard.
First, the last official price of gold comports with the intention of the
Warsaw parties. It offers stability and uniformity, characteristics
desired of a unit of conversion. 138 Second, neither the Par Value
Modification Act nor the legislative history of its repealing statute
specifically addressed the Warsaw Convention. 39 There is no indi-
cation that Congress intended to hold the liability limits of the Con-
vention unenforceable. Therefore, proponents of this standard argue
that if courts are to abide by the principle that treaty abrogation or
modification is not lightly imputed to Congress, 40 the last official
price of gold must be used to give force to the Convention. Finally,
the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB),' 4 ' the federal agency charged
with the regulation of the airline industry, espouses the use of the
last official price of gold. In a currently effective order dealing with
this issue, the CAB requires airlines to file international tariffs with
liability limits based upon a gold value of $42.22 per troy ounce. 42
Proponents assert that courts should defer to the expertise of this
federal agency. 143
137. See supra note 33.
138. See generally Asser, supra note 14.
139. See supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 80 & 99 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 45.
142. -See CAB Order 74-1-16, 39 Fed. Reg. 1526 (1974). Although this order was
issued prior to the repeal of the Par Value Modification Act, the CAB's position on the
issue was affirmed in a recent staff memorandum:
[T]he Board's current course of action [use of the last official U.S. price of gold as
a unit of conversion] is superior to any of the alternatives currently avail-
able .... Pending resolution of this issue by the three agencies [CAB, Depart-
ment of Transportation and Department of State] we believe the Board should
take no action which would disturb the conversion formula now contained in
sections 221.175 and 221.176 of the [CAB] regulation [14 C.F.R. §§ 221.175 and
221.176 (1983)].
J. Golden, Director of the Bureau of Compliance and Consumer Protection, CAB, Mem-
orandum on Warsaw Liability Limits to the CAB (May 20, 1981) (copy on file at the
offices of the Cornell International Law Journal).
Earlier, the CAB stated, with respect to the International Air Transport Association's
Conditions of Cargo Carriage: "At the present time a carrier's liability for Warsaw Traf-
fic. . . is $20 per kilogram. . . ." CAB Order 7-8-10 (1978). This value was based on
the official price of gold. It is significant, however, that in a recent order, the CAB has
authorized the filing of liability limits based on the SDR. See infra note 157 and accom-
panying text.
143. See Franklin Mint Corp., 525 F. Supp. at 1289.
The CAB's orders have been given deference in several United States courts. See
supra note 48. The district court in Maschinenfabrik Kern, .4. G., 17 Av. CAS. (CCH) at T
18,345, expressed its view as follows:
[T]his Court believes it should enforce the position taken by the CAB, the gov-
ernmental agency most intimately concerned with the transactions at hand, and
recognize the last official price of gold in the United States as the basis for con-
version and liability limitation. That price, resulting in a liability limitation of
WARSAW CONVENTION
While the last official price of gold may provide the stability and
uniformity that the drafters envisioned, its application to the War-
saw Convention is troublesome. The legislative history of the
repealing statute indicates that Congress wanted to rid itself of the
official price formula. One purpose of the repealing statute was to
authorize the United States, as a member of the IMF, to accept
amendments to the IMF Articles of Agreement. 44 The member
nations reached a compromise in which they agreed to remove gold
from the international monetary system. 145 Under the proposed
amendments, gold's official price would be abolished and the SDR
would be substituted in all transactions with the Fund.146 These
actions were taken in recognition of gold having become an outmo-
ded international monetary standard.
Because the legislative history of the repealing statute makes no
mention of the Warsaw Convention, the repeal of the official price of
gold in the United States cannot be interpreted as expressing Con-
gressional intent to render the treaty unenforceable. 47 However,
legislative history does indicate Congress' intent to abolish use of the
official price of gold for practically all purposes. This conclusion is
buttressed by language in a Senate Report which states: "[t]he only
domestic purpose for which it is necessary to define a fixed relation-
ship between the dollar and gold is the issuance of gold certifi-
cates."'148 In another report, the Senate expressed its position as
$9.07 per pound of damaged goods, also was relied upon in In re Air Crash Dis-
aster at Warsaw Poland on March 14, 1980, 535 F. Supp. 833 (E.D.N.Y. 1982)
and by the lower court in Franklin Mint Corp., 525 F. Supp. 1288. Any change
from this base should be determined by the executive and legislature. Air carri-
ers, at least in this country, have relied upon the last official price of gold and
have filed tariffs based on that rate. Thus, the public had notice of the liability
limitations. Parties, such as the commercial entities in this case, may protect
themselves through insurance. They are not made victims of hardships or injus-
tice by the maintenance of the CAB rule.
But cf infra note 156 and accompanying text.
144. See S. REP. No. 1295, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 5950, 5951.
145. See S. REP. No. 1148, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 5935, 5945.
146. See S. REP. No. 1295, supra note 144, at 3. In addition to facilitating the Fund's
divestiture of its gold holdings, the amendments were designed to liberalize the use of the
SDR. Id.
147. Treaty abrogation or modification is not imputed to Congress lightly. See supra
note 99 and accompanying text.
148. See S. REP. No. 1295, supra note 144, at 18. While it may be argued that this
language implies that there are "international" purposes for which the official price
formula may be used, a more plausible interpretation is that Congress here expressed its
intent with respect to the use of gold generally. In addition, no special meaning may be
ascribed to the word "domestic." A close review of the Senate Report reveals that prior
sections were devoted to discussions of United States "international" obligations. The
word "domestic" only was used in the new subsection to change the reader's focus, not to
limit the scope of the repealing Act.
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follows:
While it is the expressed intent of the IMF to move gold out of the interna-
tional monetary system, there are vast numbers of legal and psychological
mechanisms still in evidence in the system that will perpetuate some role for
gold. By ending the practice of having a percentage of IMF quotas paid in
gold and eliminating gold transactions between the Fund and central banks,
the Fund has taken direct actions to eliminate gold from the system. How-
ever, as with most institutional acts, it is the concurrence and sincerity of the
daily actions of members which will determine the success of the effort.
149
This language indicates that when Congress repealed gold's official
price, it sought to give maximum effect to the actions of the IMF.
Congress recognized that there would be some resistance to the
change but sought to cooperate with the IMF in abolishing the gold
standard. The conclusion that Congress intended to apply the offi-
cial price of gold to the Warsaw Convention, even after the official
price was repealed, is without support in the legislative history and
goes against the overall objective of Congress and the IMF. In addi-
tion, no great significance should be attached to the fact that some,
mechanisms still employ the last official price of gold as a conversion
factor.1 50 Use of the standard in these cases has been expressly
authorized by Congress in either the legislative history of the repeal-
ing Act or in subsequent legislation.151 The existence of express
149. See S. REP. No. 1148, supra note 145, at 12-13.
150. In the United States' amicus curiae brief in support of a writ of certiorari, the
Solicitor General points out that the last official price of gold has been used by the
United States even subsequent to its repeal:
(I) to govern issuance of gold certificates by the United States Treasury;
(2) to value gold reserves of the United States; and
(3) to determine the dollar amount of United States subscription obligations to
the capital stock of four major international financial institutions.
The Solicitor General concludes that this demonstrates a Congressional intent not to
repeal the official price of gold for all purposes. See Brief for the United States, supra
note 106, at 13-14.
151. The legislative history of the repealing Act evidences an intent to continue use of
the last official price of gold for the valuation of gold certificates. See supra note 148 and
accompanying text. Congress reaffirmed this exception and also implicitly authorized
the valuation of United States gold reserves based on the last official price. See 31
U.S.C. § 4056 (Supp. V 1981).
The United States determines the dollar amounts of its subscription olbigations to the
capital stock of four international financial institutions based upon 31 U.S.C. § 449a
(1976) which provides:
The Secretary of the Treasury shall maintain the value in terms of gold of the
holdings of United States money of the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development, the Inter-American Development Bank, the International
Development Association, and the Asian Development Bank to the extent pro-
vided in the articles of agreement of those institutions. Amounts necessary to
maintain the value may be appropriated. Amounts appropriated under this sec-
tion remain available until expended.
The Articles of Agreement of the respective organizations calculate member contribu-
tions by the last official price of gold. See Articles of Agreement of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, done December 27, 1945, art. II, § 2(a), 60
Stat. 1440, 1441, T.I.A.S. No. 1502, U.N.T.S. 134, 136; Agreement Establishing the Inter-
WARSAW CONVENTION
exceptions underscores Congressional intent to abolish the last offi-
cial price of gold except where Congress has expressly provided for
its use. Absent this intent there would have been little need for a
blanket repeal of gold's official price.
Legislative history indicates that Congress intended to abolish
the general use of the official price of gold and to continue to enforce
the Warsaw Convention. Therefore, courts should not apply the last
official price of gold for converting the liability limits of the Conven-
tion. Whitney' 52 requires that both the Convention and the repeal-
ing Act be given full effect. The judiciary should accomplish this
objective by applying the SDR, the international monetary standard
adopted by Congress as gold's substitute in the repealing Act. 53
The final argument, addressing the CAB order which requires
the filing of tariffs using the official price of gold,154 is without force
if the above legislative interpretation is accepted. While the judici-
ary accords great weight to policy decisions made by administrative
agencies in their field of expertise, 55 this doctrine of deference is
limited. The judiciary must ensure that the agency's underlying
standards and procedures are in conformity with statutory law.' 56
Congressional intent to abolish the official price of gold cannot be
overridden by the CAB's unilateral determinations. A contrary con-
clusion is inconsistent with the statutory mandate. Moreover, the
CAB has expressly recognized use of the SDR for purposes of filing
tariff liability limits. In a recent order, the CAB authorized British
Caledonian Airways Limited to increase its Warsaw liability limit
American Development Bank, done April 8, 1959, art. II, § 2(a), 10 U.S.T. 3029, 3073,
T.I.A.S. No. 4397, 389 U.N.T.S. 69, 76; Articles of Agreement of the International Devel-
opment Association, done January 26, 1960, art. II, § 2(b), 11 U.S.T. 2284, 2286, T.I.A.S.
No. 4607, 439 U.N.T.S. 249, 254; Articles of Agreement Establishing the Asian Develop-
ment Bank, done December 4, 1965, ch. II, art. 4, § 1, 17 U.S.T. 1418, 1422, T.I.A.S. No.
6103, 571 U.N.T.S. 123, 138.
152. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
153. See infra notes 158-83 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 142 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 143.
156. In Labor Board v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278, 291 (1965) (overturning administrative
decision by the National Labor Relations Board), the Court stated that "[r]eviewing
courts are not obliged to stand aside and rubber-stamp their affirmance of administrative
decisions that they deem inconsistent with a statutory mandate or that frustrate the con-
gressional policy underlying a statute." Mr. Justice Jackson expressed a similar view in
his dissenting opinion in Securities Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 215 (1947)
(majority opinion upheld administrative decision by the SEC) as follows:
[A]dministrative experience is of weight in judicial review only to this point-it
is a persuasive reason for deference to the Commission in the exercise of its dis-
cretionary powers under and within the law. It cannot be invoked to support
action outside of the law. And what action is and what is not, within the law
must be determined by courts, when authorized to review, no matter how much
deference is due to the agency's fact finding. Surely an administrative agency is
not a law unto itself. ...
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for personal injury to 100,000 SDRs.' 57
It is unlikely that Congress, recognizing the demise of the gold
standard and acting swiftly to abolish its official price in 1976,
intended to perpetuate its general use in future years. To resolve the
issue of the proper Warsaw standard, the judiciary should interpret
the legislative history in the light of the realities surrounding the
international monetary system. Courts should recognize that gold
has lost its significance as an international unit of conversion. More-
over, Congress and the international community have acknowledged
this fact by repealing gold's official price. Therefore, adoption of the
last official price of gold as the Warsaw conversion factor would con-
stitute the use of an arbitrary standard that has no basis in law and
no reference to a recognized unit of conversion.
D. THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND'S SPECIAL DRAWING
RIGHT
The best alternative proposed by the parties to translate the lia-
bility limits of the Warsaw Convention is the SDR. Established by
the International Monetary Fund in 1969 to replace gold as an inter-
national reserve asset, the SDR is related to a basket of currencies
from five IMF members. 158 One SDR is a composite of the percent-
age weight assigned to each currency. The weights, reflecting the
relative importance of each currency in world trade, are assigned as
follows: the U.S. dollar forty-two percent, the Deutschemark
nineteen percent, and thirteen percent each for the French franc, the
Japanese yen and the pound sterling.159 As a result, the effect of a
component currency's fluctuations on the SDR is directly propor-
tionate to that currency's weight in the basket. 60 The SDR's value
in U.S. dollars is determined by the total dollar value of each com-
ponent currency.161
While the composite valuation does not guarantee absolute sta-
bility, the SDR offers maximum benefits and minimum drawbacks.
Its use in translating the limitation provisions of the Warsaw Con-
157. CAB Order 81-3-143 (Mar. 24, 1981).
158. See Ward, The SDR in Transport Liability Conventions: Some Clar#Ffcations, 13 J.
MAR. L. & COM. 1, 2-3 (1981). In essence, SDRs are lines of credit against which mem-
ber states may borrow. Each member is allocated a number of SDRs which can be sold
to another IMF member for convertible currency to settle accounts.
159. Id. at 3.
160. Id.
161. For example, the U.S. value of one SDR on April 30, 1981 was $1.198579, com-
puted as follows:
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vention would result in fairly stable limits at realistic values.1 62
Because it is composed of five strong currencies, the SDR is not
affected dramatically by fluctuations of any one currency. More-
over, in some instances such fluctuations may cancel one another. 163
Opposition to the SDR takes several forms. Some argue that it
is "a creature of the IMF," subject to the will of that body. 64 Others
point out that some of the Convention's signatories are not members
of the IMF and as such do not officially recognize the SDR.165 Still
others are concerned that the SDR is tied too closely to the U.S.
dollar, which accounts for forty-two percent of its value.166
Despite these concerns, there are compelling reasons why the
Second Circuit should have applied the SDR. Because of its relative
stability, the SDR fully comports with the intent of the Convention's
drafters.1 67 The parties to the Convention recognized the advantages
of the SDR and incorporated its use in the Montreal Protocols.
1 68
Even the legislative history of the statute repealing the Par Value
Modification Act expresses Congress' intent to promote this unit of
conversion.' 69 In addition, the repealing statute itself authorized use
of the SDR for determining United States obligations to the IMF
with the primary objective of making the SDR the principal reserve
asset in the international monetary system.170 By repealing gold's
official price and openly promoting the SDR as a substitute, Con-
Unit Exchange US$
Currency Amount Rate Equivalent
1 2 3 4
U.S. dollar 0.540 1.0000 0.540000
Deutschemark 0.460 2.2145 0.207722
French franc 0.740 5.2145 0.140845
Japanese yen 34.000 215.1300 0.158044
Pound sterling 0.071 2.1404 0.151968
SDR 1.00 = 1.198579
Merren, The SDR as a Unit ofAccount in Private Transactions, 16 INT'L LAW. 503, 515
(1982).
162. The SDR is not subject to tremendous fluctuations in value as is the market price
of gold, and it also is not dependent upon a single government to give it a value, as is the
French franc and the official United States price of gold.
163. See Merren, supra note 161, at 512; see also Ward, supra note 158, at 4.
164. A 75% majority of the total IMF voting constituents is required to determine the
method of SDR valuation. Further, a "high majority" of 85% is required to change the
principle of valuation in effect. See Merren, supra note 161, at 510.
165. See Ward, supra note 158, at 8.
166. Id. at 4 n.6.
167. See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 146.
170. See Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the International Mone-
tary Fund, done April 30, 1976, art. IV, § 2(b), 29 U.S.T. 2203, 2208-09, T.I.A.S. No.
8937; see also id at art. VIII, § 7, 29 U.S.T. at 2226; Bretton Woods Agreements Act,
Amendments, Pub. L. No. 94-564, 90 Stat. 2660 (codified at 22 U.S.C. § 286e-5 (1982)).
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gress implicitly adopted the SDR as the Warsaw unit of conversion.
Adoption of the SDR is consistent with fundamental principles of
treaty interpretation. The SDR complies with the intent of the draft-
ers under changed circumstances' 7' and gives effect to the subse-
quent conduct of the parties. 72
Furthermore, the SDR is widely recognized as an international
unit of conversion. It has been adopted in fifteen international con-
ventions and is being considered for use in four other international
agreements. 73 At least seventeen international organizations use the
SDR.174 In addition, the World Bank, the International Develop-
ment Association, the Arab Monetary Fund, the Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements and other institutions have been authorized to buy
or sell SDRs and to receive or use them in loans, pledges, and
grants. 175 Commercial banks, in response to these developments,
have acted to facilitate a secondary market for SDR instruments. 76
Commentators predict that there will be an increase in the private
use of the SDR as a unit of conversion, and that the IMF and major
commercial banks "seem ready to promote the SDR as an 'all-
weather instrument' for worldwide use."' 177
Many foreign governments also have recognized the emerging
role of the SDR as an international unit of conversion. Great Brit-
ain, Sweden, and Canada are among those that have adopted the
SDR for purposes of the Convention. 78 Recently, in Netherlands v.
Giant Shipping Corp., 179 the Supreme Court of the Netherlands held
in favor of the SDR in construing the Brussels Convention on mari-
time liability.
Finally, to serve the purposes of the Convention, the unit of
conversion selected should have several characteristics: (1) it should
171. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
173. See Merren, supra note 161, at 505.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 506-07.
177. Id. at 520.
178. See Carriage by Air (Sterling Equivalents) Order 1980 [Great Britain], Stat. Inst.
Part 1, § 1, No. 281 (February 29, 1980); Carrier by Air Act [Sweden] (SFS 1957:297),
amendment to Chapter 9, § 22 (SFS 1978:132) (March 30, 1978); Carriage by Air Act
Gold Franc Conversion Regulations, Can. Stat. 0. & Regs. 83-79, (January 14, 1983).
179. Judgment of May 1, 1981 (Giant Shpping Corp.), supra note 42. Faced with the
problem of converting liability limits originally based upon the Poincar franc, the court
rejected the market price of gold as a substitute for the outmoded gold standard and
adopted the SDR. The court reasoned that because the SDR had replaced gold in the
international monetary system, its use was in consonance with "the adjustment of inter-
national treaties and national laws to the changed monetary situation." The Giant Ship-
ping court rendered its decision even though an amendment substituting the SDR as the
Convention's unit of account was not yet in force. For further discussion of this case and
other foreign decisions applying the SDR, see supra note 42.
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be universally recognized or as widely accepted as possible; 80
(2) exchange rates based on the unit should be available daily to
afford conversion into domestic currencies;' 81 (3) it should be sta-
ble;182 and (4) it should ensure uniformity in the valuation of curren-
cies so that the value limits of liability will be equal at any time,
regardless of the currency of payment. 183 Employing the SDR as the
unit of conversion would most closely comport with these essential
characteristics. It is the most logical alternative to give force to the
Warsaw Convention, to comply with the intent of its drafters, and to
effect congressional intent to discard an outmoded international
monetary standard.
180. The SDR has become "the cornerstone of the new international system of
finance." P. SAMUELSON, Supra note 21, at 612. See supra notes 173-79 and accompany-
ing text.
181. SDR rates are posted by the IMF for each business day and are carried by sev-
eral wire services, financial periodicals and major newspapers. They also are published
twice monthly in the IMF Survey, and monthly with a two-month data lag in the IMF's
International Financial Statistics. Information also may be obtained from IMF head-
quarters in Washington, D.C., at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and at the
Central Banks of several IMF members. See Merren, supra note 161, at 151.
182. See supra notes 158-63 and accompanying text.
183. See Ward, supra note 158, at 1-2. TWA illustrates conversion of liability limits
using the SDR:
1 Poincare franc (90% fine gold) - 0.655 gram of fine
gold
1 Poincare franc (100% fine gold) = 0.05895 gram of fine
gold
I SDR (gold value of March 31, 1978) = 0.888671 gram of fine
gold
The number of francs in one
SDR = 0.888671 - 15.075 rounded to
0.05895 15
The Warsaw limit of 250 francs
per kilogram converted to SDRs 250 = 16.67 SDRs per
15 kilogram, rounded to
17 SDRs
Dollar value of I SDR on March 23, - 1.28626
1979
17 SDRs per kilogram times 1.28626 = $21.87 per kilogram
See Appellant's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 690 F.2d 303
(2d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 51 U.S.L.W. 3883 (U.S. June 13, 1983) 20 n.34 (copy on file
at the offices of the Cornell International Law Journal). The figure derived is approxi-
mately equivalent to that derived when using the official price of gold as the comparison
unit.
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CONCLUSION
In Franklin Mint Corp. v. Trans WorldAirlines, Inc., the Second
Circuit exceeded the scope of its constitutional powers in holding
that the Warsaw Convention's limits on liability for loss of cargo are
unenforceable in United States courts. Well-established principles
of treaty interpretation require a contrary holding. In repealing the
official price of gold, Congress implicitly adopted the International
Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Right as the new unit of conver-
sion applicable to the Warsaw Convention. The Second Circuit
should have applied the Special Drawing Right and given force to
the Convention.
Louis Robert Martinez
